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LEGAL REFORM AND THE CHONGQING 
EFFECT: 
TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK? 
Veronica Pastor 
One step forward and two steps back 
Nobody gets too far like that 
One step forward and two steps back 
This kind of dance can never last 
 
Desert Rose, One Step Forward and Two Steps Back 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For those steeped in the Western legal tradition, the Chinese po-
litical and legal system is, in the famous words of Winston Churchill, 
a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.1  Of course, Church-
ill was describing the potential actions of Russia, not China.2  But, to 
continue borrowing from Churchill, perhaps there is a key – Chinese 
national interest and the interest of the Chinese Communist Party.3  
This research explores the interaction between political, economic, 
and legal reform, and posits that the Chongqing incident4 was ulti-
mately a positive turning point in the country’s institutional devel-
opment.  The theory presented herein is that although some argue the 
manner in which the Bo Xilai trial5 was conducted, and its aftermath, 
represents a step back in political aperture, it is actually an example 
 
 1. Winston Churchill, The Russian Enigma, BBC (Oct. 1, 1939), available at 
http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The Chongqing incident refers to the emergence of an alternative economic model un-
der an outdated authoritarian Maoist political model that culminated in the spectacular 
trial and conviction of its unorthodox proponent, Bo Xilai. François Godement, China 
at the Crossroads, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 4 (2012), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR53_CHINA_ESSAY_AW.pdf. 
 5. Bo Xilai’s Trial: Going Down Fighting, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21584367-china-has-been-gripped-
extraordinary-courtroom-drama-going-down-fighting. 
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of the  “two steps forward, one step back”6 so closely associated with 
Communist political regimes in transition, and holds promise for con-
solidation of institutional reform in China.  In exploring the riddle, 
this article attempts to place the Chinese legal system in its historic 
context before moving to the inextricable relationship between law 
and politics in China.  Finally, it is argued that the Bo Xilai prosecu-
tion, while undeniably politically motivated and rife with retrograde 
elements, was also a cautious but definitive move towards the tri-
umph of a new model of consolidated institutionalization.   
A.  Overview of the Chongqing Economic Model 
A discussion of the Chongqing economic model is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it is important to understand its key elements.  
Until the arrival of Bo Xilai, Chongqing was an economic backwa-
ter.7  Chongqing is barely on the right side of the Aihui-Tengchong 
line that divides the country between the arid mountains and the fer-
tile plains,8 and one of the “four furnaces” of China.9  In 1997, the 
Chongqing municipality was separated from the Sichuan Province,10 
and became a province-level municipality.11  Perhaps due to its his-
torical significance as the capital of China during the Second World 
War, in 2000 Chongqing was made the linchpin of the central gov-
ernment’s “Go West” program to develop the economically-lagging 
western half of the country.12  Bo Xilai arrived there at the end of 
 
 6. George Walden at CBYA Oxford, CBYA (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.cbya.org.uk/news/2012/04/26/george-walden-at-cbya-oxford/. 
 7. Kevin Lu, The Chongqing Model Worked, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/08/the-chongqing-model-worked/. 
 8. BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRADITIONS AND GROWTH 20-21 (MIT 
Press ed., 2007). 
 9. Id. at 20 (Referring to the long, hot summers and the other three “furnaces” of Wuhan, 
Changsha and Nanjing). 
 10. Id. at 22. 
 11. This is the highest political-administrative classification in China.  The mayor and the 
Secretary of the Communist Party – the highest authority in a province-level munici-
pality—report directly to the central government in Beijing.  The other province-level 
municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  There are 34 administrative di-
visions in China: 4 province-level municipalities, 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 
2 Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau) and the claimed Taiwan 
province. Administrative Division System, CHINA THROUGH A LENS, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/feature/38436.htm. 
 12. Lu, supra note 7. 
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2007, and immediately got to work in effecting an astounding eco-
nomic transformation aimed at assuring his place in the political pan-
theon.13  Within 5 years, as a result of Bo Xilai’s unorthodox policies, 
including the “smash black” campaign14 to wipe out organized crime, 
the “sing red” campaign15 to revive traditional communist-nationalist 
fervor, and a focus on use of state resources to stimulate economic 
growth and collective consumption, Chongqing’s GDP was growing 
at an average of 15.8% annually compared to 10.5% for all of Chi-
na.16  The economic gap between Chongqing and the other three mu-
nicipal provinces was all but closed.17  The way in which Bo Xilai’s 
economic success resulted in his political downfall is intimately tied 
with the nature of the Chinese political and legal system. 
II.  THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 
Communist ideology everywhere views traditional legal systems 
as a means by which the ruling classes and the bourgeoisie oppress 
the peasants and the proletariat.18  In China, the Confucian tradition 
also operated as an informal but effective legal system.19  Moreover, 
Mao Zedong’s ideology of permanent revolution as a means for pro-
gress towards true Communism negated the existence of a formal le-
gal system, as one of the very purposes of an institutionalized legal 
system is to provide continuity and predictability – the antithesis of 
revolution.20  Upon seizing power, Mao’s Communist party abolished 
all laws promulgated by its predecessor, the Kuomintang, and set out 
to replace them with a new system.21  The evolution of the Chinese 
legal system from that date to the present can be best understood by 
reference to the tension between the “societal” and the “jural” mod-
els.22   
 
 13. Bob Davis, In Chinese Politics, a Fall-and a Rise, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303933704577531623651645112. 
 14. Lu, supra note 7. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION 
179 (Pearson Education, Inc., 8th ed. 2012). 
 19. Id at 180. 
 20. Id at 85. 
 21. Id at 179. 
 22. Id at 180. 
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The societal model focuses on informal, largely unwritten forms 
of conduct and values administered ad hoc.23  At the other extreme, 
the jural model represents the “rule of law,” and it centers on a codi-
fied body of law administered predictably by an organized and inde-
pendent judiciary.24  However, it is important to remember that a key 
feature of Western justice systems, the separation of powers, has nev-
er existed in the Chinese tradition.  Dreyer identifies five distinct 
stages in this struggle, coinciding with the country’s dominant politi-
cal faction at the time.25   
The first stage (1949-1953) follows the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, when the Communist government abol-
ished all previous laws and sought to create a new system under the 
Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC).26  The system included a procuracy, an office 
in charge of ensuring that proper legal procedure is followed in pros-
ecutions.27  In this first stage, more often than not, this new Soviet-
inspired legality was honored in the breach.28  The second stage 
(1954-1957) began with the promulgation of China’s first state con-
stitution in 1954, and represents the first true incursion of the jural 
model.29  The new constitution established a formal judiciary in addi-
tion to the procuracy, both under the newly created National People’s 
Congress (NPC).30  The first law schools were opened and law 
emerged as a budding profession.31  However, although the constitu-
tion guaranteed equality before the law, in practice, designated class 
enemies and reactionaries had no constitutional rights.32  Nonetheless, 
towards the end of the 1954-1957 period, the need for a more pre-
dictable and consistent legal system began to be recognized as neces-
 
 23. Id at 180-81. 
 24. Id at 180. 
 25. Id at 179-203. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.; see also, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Sept. 20, 1954 
(China). 
 30. DREYER, supra note 18. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; see also, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Sept. 20, 1954 
(China). 
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sary to consolidate the economic gains of Communism.33  Here, legal 
history began to take the first of two steps back.   
In 1957, Mao announced the “Hundred Flowers” movement, in-
viting all to offer constructive criticism of the system.34  Lawyers 
stepped forward to point out the arbitrariness of the legal system’s 
application and as a result, they and the reforms were crushed as 
counterrevolutionary in a resurgence of the societal model (1957-
1965).35  Just as it is always darkest before the dawn, the worst was 
yet to come.   
In 1966, Mao announced the beginning of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and declared that one of its aims was the destruction of all for-
mal laws and their replacement by party policy.36  Mao’s Red Guards 
were instructed to destroy all remnants of a judiciary, and the Peo-
ple’s Daily published an article titled “In Praise of Lawlessness.”37  
During the widespread persecutions that followed, prosecutors were 
self-appointed and prosecutions were based on denunciations rather 
than facts.38  It is significant to point out that Bo Xilai’s father, Bo 
Yibo, was one of the many victims of the purges, and that Xilai grew 
up during this era and himself spent five years in a re-education 
camp.39  In 1975, a new constitution was passed, the procuracy was 
formally abolished, the courts placed under the state’s security or-
gans, and mass counterrevolutionary trials were allowed.40  The judi-
ciary essentially disappeared, and disputes were resolved by political 
means.41 
The death of Chairman Mao therefore occurred at a time where 
the legal system could only be described as a chaotic vacuum.42  
When Deng Xiaoping took over, he faced the daunting task of build-
ing a new society that could bring prosperity to the people, while 
 
 33. DREYER, supra note 18. 
 34. Id. 
 35. They were accused of ignoring the political struggle and the class struggle implications 
of law by insisting on “ridiculous” notions of equality before the law, legal representa-
tion of the accused  and reliance on facts as the basis for trials. Id at 183. 
 36. Id. at 179. 
 37. Id. at 184. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; see also, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 17, 1975 (China). 
 41. Dreyer, supra note 18. 
 42. Id. 
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promoting stability and preserving national reconciliation and nation-
al unity, all without an institutional framework.43   
Deng recognized the need to create a legal system that provided 
predictability and stability both for individuals and for economic ac-
tivity.  The new constitution adopted in 1978 brought back many of 
the jural model elements of the 1954 constitution, including the re-
turn of the procuracy and legal process rights.44  However, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that a 1982 amendment defined China’s polit-
ical regime as a “people’s democratic dictatorship”45–that is, no 
longer a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” but certainly not a “constitu-
tional democracy” either.  There is an inherent contradiction between 
the words “democratic” and “dictatorship,” as the two are mutually 
exclusive.   
To an outside observer, this sort of double-speak may seem like 
gobbledygook.46  To an astute China observer, however, this may rep-
resent a clear indication of progress in the midst of a great tension be-
tween Party factions that believe liberalization is the way to sustaina-
ble economic and social progress, and those who fear that too much 
change too soon may result in rapid descent into social chaos in a 
country where the deep wounds of the Cultural Revolution have not 
had time to heal.  The post-1982 years, then, can be seen as the play-
ground in which China’s transition to a jural model, Chinese-style 
was effected.  Why, then, do we expect China to conform to Western 
models, much less immediately?  Party leaders have repeatedly made 
clear that the Western model of legal liberalization is not applicable 
to China.47  The most salient example is the leaders’ repeated declara-
tion that the doctrine of separation of powers, so cherished in the 
West, is seen as bourgeois and unsuitable for China, because to have 
independence between the branches of government is to invite confu-
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 5, 1978 (China). 
 45. Xianfa [Constitution] Dec. 4, 1982 (China), available at 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2004.pdf (amendments reflected 
in 1982 Constitution). 
 46. One of the great Confucian values is “right speak”.  In popular terms, this means that 
saying the right words, rather than focusing in what those words actually mean, is par-
amount. Id. 
 47. Suisheng Zhao, Political Liberalization without Democratization: Pan Wei’s proposal 
for political reform, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 333 (2003). 
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sion and chaos.48  Thus, according to Dreyer, China seems to be mov-
ing towards a society under the rule by law, rather than the rule of 
law.49  For example, court officials in China may deny the release of 
certain information, and individual rights are subordinate to public 
policy.50   
To critics that argue a strict rule of law model is the only ac-
ceptable way to organize a market-oriented economy, a Chinese real-
ist may reply that the economic data of the past few years fails to 
support the assertion that the model is universally desirable.  Moreo-
ver, the liberal democracy model of the West has become significant-
ly discredited as a vessel for delivering economic growth and raising 
living standards to the populace as a result of the Great Recession and 
its aftermath.  Only if we stop gauging Chinese actions and develop-
ments by purely Western standards, and place them in their proper 
historic and social context, can we understand the Chongqing inci-
dent and its consequences, such as an apparent hardening of repres-
sion, as a movement towards China’s integration into the community 
of jural nations, but under its own terms. 
III.  THE MAKING OF A PRINCELING 
By all accounts, except his own, Bo Xilai wanted to be Prem-
ier.51  There is also no doubt that, as a card-carrying member of the 
Crown Prince Party, his ambition was within the realm of reason.52  
However, since there are no elections in China, there is no legitimate 
way to run for the post.  Bo had to resort to an obscure combination 
of merit, popularity and political capital.  Because there is no formal 
legal structure within which to rise politically in China, he was faced 
with both the necessity and the latitude to employ unorthodox meth-
 
 48. Chaos is anathema to the Chinese leadership and indeed to the Chinese people.  One of 
the main reasons for wide support of Communist policies among the populace in 1949 
was that the Communist Party was seen as introducing order after fifty years of war 
and chaos. DREYER, supra note 18, at 188. 
 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. Id. at 187. 
 51. Bo Xilai Told Trial He had Orders from the Top to Deal with Chongqing Police Chief, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (last updated Sept. 1, 2013 8:01am), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1300981/bo-xilai-told-trial-he-had-orders-
top-deal-chongqing-police-chief. 
 52. Dreyer, supra note 18 (the Crown Prince Party are the descendants of prominent and 
influential senior communist officials). 
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ods to do so.  By all accounts, except his own, Xi Jinping also wanted 
to be Premier.53  In 2007 Xi went to Shanghai and Bo went to Chong-
qing.54  By 2012, Xi was Premier, and Bo was on trial for corrup-
tion.55  Why did Bo fail where Xi succeeded? 
There is no doubt that Bo Xilai is an exceptional person; tall, 
handsome, photogenic, charismatic, and fluent in English, Bo is also 
trained in international history and is media-savvy.56  But to under-
stand Bo’s sense of destiny and entitlement, his success, his unortho-
dox methods and ruthlessness, and his ultimate downfall, it is essen-
tial to understand his background.  For there is no doubt that Bo Xilai 
is also ruthless and callous.   
Bo Xilai’s father, Bo Yibo, had impeccable revolutionary cre-
dentials.57  He was a veteran of the Long March and a member of the 
Eight Immortals58 who eventually steered the country from the Mao-
ist catastrophe to success through market reform after Mao’s death.  
The Eight Immortals, headed by Deng Xiaoping, believed in the ne-
cessity of market reforms but saw no place for political liberaliza-
tion.59  Bo Yibo was the first Minister of Finance of the People’s Re-
 
 53. Tania Branigan, The Guardian Profile, Xi Jinping, GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/xi-jinping-profile-china (when asked 
by a reporter during a 2012 foreign tour whether he thought he was going to be Prem-
ier, Xi replied “are you trying to give me a fright?”). 
 54. Alice Miller, The Bo Xilai Affair in Central Leadership Politics, 38 CHINA LEADERSHIP 
MONITOR 1, 4, 8, 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM38AM.pdf. 
 55. Profile: Bo Xilai, BBC (last updated Sept. 21, 2013, 11:13pm), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19709555. 
 56. Bo Xilai studied international history at Peking University for two years and then 
shifted to journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. JOHN GARNAUT, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BO 29 (Penguin Specials 2012). 
57. Bo Yibo was born to a poor peasant family in Shanshi.  His earliest memory is said to 
be of his mother giving birth to his younger brother and then drowning him because 
the family did not have enough to eat. During the Civil War, he spent five years in a 
Kuomintang prison before setting up the Shanshi Suicide Squad to fight the Japanese 
using guerrilla tactics during Word War II and luring Yan Xishan, a local warlord, into 
the Red Army with his 200,000 men. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 13. 
 58. Bo Yibo, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://www/global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1338315/Bo-Yibo.  The other sev-
en are Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Zhangkun, Wang 
Zhen and Song Rengqiong. 
 59. As such, Bo Yibo participated in the purge of Hu Yaobang, who advocated for politi-
cal liberalization, and he supported the repression against the June 4 protesters. Joseph 
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public of China, and Vice Premier under Zhou Enlai.60  Xilai and his 
sibling grew up in the Zhongnanhai military compound for members 
of the elite, right next to the Forbidden City, and attended the Num-
ber 4 Middle School for children of the elite.61  When the Cultural 
Revolution broke out, Bo Xilai eagerly joined the Red Guards, and 
with other Crown Princelings, formed a group called United Action 
(lian dong).62  However, the older Bo and his contemporaries paid a 
tremendous personal price for their position and convictions.  Bo Yi-
bo was purged as a “capitalist roader” because he advocated for trade 
with the West.63  He and his wife, Xilai’s mother Hu Ming, were per-
secuted.64  Bo Yibo himself was tortured and imprisoned, and Hu 
Ming was beaten to death.65  It is a well-documented fact that Xilai 
actively participated in the persecution of his own father.  However, 
reports differ as to whether he participated in torturing and beating 
Bo Yibo.66   
In the end, Xilai’s revolutionary fervor and ruthlessness did not 
save him from the madness of the Cultural Revolution.  All the Bo 
siblings were imprisoned.67  Xilai was sent to the infamous Camp 789 
for five years, a reeducation camp for princelings where inmates re-
portedly endured starvation, beatings, sleep deprivation and general 
filthy conditions. 68   
 
Kahn, Bo Yibo, Leader Who Helped Reshape Chinese Economy, Dies at 98, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/17/world/asia/17bo.html 
 60. Id. 
 61. Chris Buckley, Insight: Children of Mao’s wrath vie for power in China, REUTERS 
(Jun. 22, 2012, 7:14am), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/22/us-china-politics-
bo-idUSBRE85L04E20120622. 
 62. PEH SHING HUEI, WHEN THE PARTY ENDS, CHINA’S LEAPS AND STUMBLES AFTER THE 
BEIJING OLYMPICS 196 (Straight Times Press 2014). 
 63. John Garnaut, The Rock Star of Chinese Politics, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 25, 
2012, http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-rock-star-of-chinese-politics-20121025-
287sf.html. 
 64. Kahn, supra note 59. 
 65. Reports differ as to whether she was beaten to death or committed suicide.  Officially 
she committed suicide out of shame.  Jamil Anderlini, Bo Xilai: power, death and poli-
tics, FT MAG. (July 20, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/d67b90f0-
d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UwyiWHwh. 
 66. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 39 (author says no); HUEI, supra note 62, at 196. 
 67. Kahn, supra note 59. 
 68. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 26. 
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Those who, like Bo Yibo and the rest of the Eight Immortals, 
were later rehabilitated, wielded very substantial influence for the rest 
of their lives and beyond.  After Mao’s death and his own rehabilita-
tion, Bo Yibo returned to his old post as Vice Premier under Deng 
Xiaoping to help Deng achieve market reforms.69  Putting all rancor 
aside, the older Bo was instrumental in the stellar ascent of his son.  
In 2006, Bo Xilai was wielding a campaign to become Vice Premier, 
after having been Mayor of Dalian for two decades and Minister of 
Commerce.70  In both posts, Xilai proved to be exceptionally success-
ful, and very popular and personable on his own merits.  However, in 
January 2007 Bo Yibo died, and Bo Xilai lost his campaign to be-
come Vice Premier.71  Because of his status as a princeling and the 
still-strong support of his family’s network, he was made a member 
of the Politburo.72  Unfortunately for him, Xilai did not get along par-
ticularly well with princelings of the fourth generation, such as Wen 
Jiabao and Hu Jintao, or with his peers, including fifth generation Xi 
Jinpin.73  Viewed as too flamboyant and having lost his best support-
er, Xilai was “exiled” to Chongqing, 1500 kilometers away from Bei-
jing, as General Secretary of the Communist Party.74  There Xilai set 
to replicate his successes as Mayor of Dalian,75 Governor of Liaoning 
and Minister of Commerce on a grander scale with his usual unortho-
dox methods, becoming both adored and reviled in equal measure in 
the process.76  However, he could no longer count on his father’s 
guanxi to protect him, and the Chinese political culture is not fond of 
 
 69. Id. at 11. 
 70. Id. at 45. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 46.  Politburo is the main group of people in a Communist government who 
make decisions about policy.  Politburo, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/politburo. 
 73. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 46. 
 74. Id. 
 75. With his media training, Bo was very successful in raising the international profile of 
Dalian with his “three treasures”: football, fashion shows and greenery.  He ordered 
the Dalian football team, Dalian Shide, to win the national cup, and became known as 
the “football mayor”.  He put Dalian on the international map by turning the Dalian In-
ternational fashion Festival into a gala on a global scale, and he went on a huge tree 
and grass planting campaign to emulate Singapore.  HUEI, supra note 62 at 197. 
 76. Id. 
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attention-grabbing excesses.77  The stage was set for a bang of epic 
proportions. 
IV.  THE CHONGQING MODEL 
With a population of over thirty-three million people, Chongqing 
is the largest city in the world.78  This simple statistic, however, hides 
a much more complex truth, for, as discussed earlier, Chongqing is a 
province-level municipality.  Seventy percent of Chongqing’s inhab-
itants are in fact rural, and widely spread across the Yangtze Valley.79  
This demographic circumstance helps explain the populist appeal of 
Bo’s policies.  After taking a year to observe the realities of Chong-
qing, Bo set to work.80  He decided to appeal to the masses that had 
benefitted from the glory days of the Cultural Revolution and were 
now feeling left behind.81  Bo identified three popular issues: crime, 
economic inequality and lack of opportunity, and general disillu-
sionment.82 The largely rural populations, including rural to urban 
migrant “floating populations” and the masses of urban populations, 
increasingly found themselves on the losing end of economic reform, 
and were beginning to long for the good old days.83  Bo Xilai intro-
duced a four-pronged program to make Chongqing a model of Chi-
nese success: (i) sing red, (ii) red GDP, (iii) go green and (iv)”strike 
black.”84    
A.  Chang Hong – Sing Red 
“Sing red” was a campaign in the tradition of the heyday of 
Maoist China.85  It identified an enemy, “the bourgeoisie,” without 
 
 77. A GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 47 (“Guanxi – the ubiquitous term for relationships in-
volving reciprocal obligations.  ”). 
 78. Id. at 48. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 49. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 51 (“Floating populations .refers to the large and increasing number of migrants 
without local household registration status.”); Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, China’s 
Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census, 30(3) POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 467, 467 (Sept. 30, 2004), 
http://www.albany.edu/imc/Liang_Ma_PDR_2004.pdf. 
 84. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 49-51. 
 85. Id. at 49. 
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really explaining who exactly that enemy was, or why it was respon-
sible for the current state of affairs.86  Sensing the mood of the eco-
nomic losers and their need for the comforts of the past, Bo covered 
the city with slogans redolent of the Mao years, such as “the Com-
munist Party is like the sun, there is brightness wherever it shines.”87  
Bo banned commercial advertising on the municipal television chan-
nel, replacing it with political propaganda and slogans, and also in-
sisted on having personal editorial control of the news.88  On top of 
that, he introduced a mild version of the reeducation campaigns of the 
Cultural Revolution, by sending 200,000 officials to the countryside 
to “learn from the peasants.”89   
B.  Red GDP 
But Bo combined his slogan-laden nostalgia with a real program 
to improve the lives of the economic losers.  Although at the time the 
country was ambivalent about foreign investment, Bo used his per-
sonal charm and economic incentives to attract global companies that 
would open manufacturing facilities to provide jobs.90  Thus, at a time 
when the gap between the rich and the poor was widening across 
China, Bo managed to directly improve people’s day-to-day lives by 
connecting Chongqing to the global economy.  Hewlett-Packard, 
Ford, Samsung, Foxcon and many others opened factories there, and 
Bo ordered the construction of millions of affordable housing units 
for the workers.91  Chongqing shot to the top of the Chinese GDP 
growth tables.  At the same time, to placate critics, Bo launched a “go 
green” campaign to make Chongqing a livable city in the model of 
Singapore.92   
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; Tom Orlick & Melissa Powers, You Can’t Have a Party Without Music: A Red 
Song Primer, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REALTIME (June 30, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/06/30/you-cant-have-a-party-without-music-
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 89. Id. at 49-50. 
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C.  Dai Hei – Strike Black 
Finally, the “strike black” campaign aimed to eliminate orga-
nized crime and corruption, and provide citizens with a sense of per-
sonal security.93  In order to accomplish his goal, Bo brought with 
him a former chief of police from his days as Governor of Liaoning, 
Wang Lijun, making him police chief and vice mayor.94  It was the 
extremes of Bo’s methods in combatting crime that were the catalyst 
for his ultimate downfall.     
Before Bo’s arrival, Chongqing had an international reputation 
as a center of corruption, prostitution, and criminal activity.  Bo’s ef-
forts to clean up the city were initially met with support from the top 
leadership in Beijing, to the point that some voices across the world 
called for the model to be replicated nationwide, and even interna-
tionally.95  Between 2009 and 2011, it is estimated that over 5,500 
people were arrested, and the citizens of Chongqing felt safe for the 
first time in many years.96  However, not all of the people arrested 
were criminals.97  Some were merely businessmen who had become 
too successful and did not wish to cooperate with Bo’s social pro-
jects, or lawyers, judges or political opponents who objected to Bo’s 
methods.98  According to the Wall Street Journal’s Stanley Lubman, 
the “strike black” campaign “involved misuse of both the courts and 
the police.”99  Others have stated that lawyers for defendants were in-
timidated, torture was used to extract confessions, and an estimated 
1,000 people were sent to labor camps.100 
Regardless of the ultimate historical judgment, it is clear that Bo 
Xilai succeeded in creating a new model and promoting it as well.  In 
his mind, Bo was building the “Harmonious Society” touted by Hu 
 
 93. Stanley Lubman, Bo Xilai’s Gift to Chongqing: A Legal Mess, WALL ST. J.: CHINA 
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Jintao,101 albeit through some of the unconventional methods of 
“permanent revolution” touted by Mao,102 and all was well… for a 
while.  Bo became “the pin-up boy for the new left, the old left, the 
Maoist left and, it appeared, anyone who was attracted to the allure of 
shiny rising power.”103  According to Professor Cui Zhiyuan of 
Xinhua University, and a leader of the New Left Movement, Bo’s 
Chongqing model became “a new economic pattern that transcends 
left and right.”104  Before having to admit he was on the payroll of the 
Chongqing government, Cui declared, “Chongqing is an experiment 
to promote more political democracy for the common people.”105  
Yang Fan, a professor of Economics at China University of Political 
Science and Law, founded the Internet site Utopia, to defend Bo’s 
policies and lauded the reforms in a book he co-authored, The 
Chongqing Model.106  One of Xi Jinping’s first moves after being ap-
pointed successor to Hu Jintao in 2010, was to travel to Chongqing to 
tell Bo that his singing red campaign “had gone deeply into the hearts 
of the people and was worthy of praise.”107  Even Henry Kissinger 
said in a 2011 sing red meeting, “I saw the vision for the future,” and 
he declared himself to be “shaken by the vitality of the city.”108 Kis-
singer could not have known that by 2011 the tide was already turn-
ing within the enigma, and that the riddle of Bo’s rise would soon 
unwind because of a murder mystery. 
V.  FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BO 
Two legal developments would bring down the Bo house of 
cards.  The first development was the ill-advised persecution of Li 
Zhuang,109 a well-regarded lawyer with important connections in Bei-
 
 101. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 51. 
 102. Id. at 49-50. 
 103. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 63. 
 104. Id.; John Garnaut, Show Them the Money, Old China, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 
Mar. 16, 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/business/show-them-the-money-old-china-
20110325-1ca3f.html.   
 105. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 63; Garnaut, supra note 104. 
 106. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 65-66; YANG FAN, SU WEI, & LIU SHIWEN, CHONGQING 
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jing, and the second was the operatic murder of businessman Neil 
Heywood by Bo’s wife Gu Kailai, also a lawyer.110  By early 2011, 
even Professor Yang was calling Bo’s stewardship into question, say-
ing “His program should include democracy, rule of law, market eco-
nomics, but now it is too close to the Old Left and New Left and the 
Cultural Revolution […] Bo’s problems in Chongqing will be ex-
posed and it will turn to chaos.”111  The Bo house of cards was about 
to fall, and the story and its outcome would play an important role in 
the future of China. 
VI.  ONE PERSECUTION TOO FAR112 
 Li Zhuang is a well-known and respected lawyer in private 
practice.  When Bo sought to prosecute Wen Qiang, Wang Lijun’s 
predecessor, Li Zhuang considered defending him.113  Although he 
ultimately declined to take Wen’s case, he did defend Gong Guang-
mo, who was brought to trial on corruption charges and falsely ac-
cused of being part of the Chongqing mafia, the core target of the 
strike black campaign.114  Gong initially confessed, but on Li’s advice 
later recanted his confession claiming it was extracted under tor-
ture.115  Recanting confessions in a public forum was an unusual prac-
tice, and shocking to those who, like Bo, had grown up politically 
under the specter of the Cultural Revolution -- when the Party was 
always right, people falsely confessed to the most absurd crimes and 
stood steadfastly by their confessions.  Bo and Wang arranged to ab-
 
 110. Id. at 97. 
 111. Id . at 66. 
 112. I purposefully use the word “persecution” here rather than “prosecution”, as a “prose-
cution is a legally and legitimate persecution under due process of law.  That was not 
the case here.   
 113. GARNAUT, supra note 56, at 67. 
 114. Gong Guangmo was accused of trying to bribe Wen Qiang, not an unusual practice in 
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any connection to the organized mafia-like networks that the Strike Black campaign 
sought to eradicate. Id. at 67. 
 115. “Twice he tried to kill himself by hitting his head against the wall, and then he tried to 
bit off his own tongue.”  Guards severed his partially cut-off tongue, but did not allow 
him to receive any medical attention for two days, according to lawyer Zhu Mingyong.  
Id. at 67-68 (citing Elizabeth M. Lynch, China’s First Test of the New Exclusionary 
Rules – A Dog Without a Bite, CHINA LAW AND POLICY (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://chinalawandpolicy.com/2010/09/30/china%E2%80%99s-first-test-of-the-new-
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duct Li from Beijing and bring him back to Chongqing for trial on 
charges of coaching Gong to give false testimony.116  Of course, Li 
initially confessed, only to recant at the trial by exclaiming “My con-
fession is fake!”117  Bo then brought additional fabricated charges 
against Li.118  
This time, however, Bo was up against a truly formidable adver-
sary.  Li’s own lawyer, his colleague Chen Youxi, promptly spread 
the news on the Internet and set in motion a lively debate about 
whether the New Left that Bo represented had swung all the way to 
become what Xilai’s own father had denounced at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution: “To be a leftist among the leftists is to be a left-
ist in quotation marks, which is also to be a rightist.”119  With Li’s 
persecution, Bo had unknowingly turned Chongqing and his work in-
to a proxy for serious debate regarding China’s political future and 
his own legitimacy.  This debate and the ideological chaos it threat-
ened to create, brought about an opportunity for liberal lawyers, led 
by Chen, to expose and denounce via Internet campaigns the illegal, 
strong-arm tactics employed by Bo, which constituted the dark un-
derbelly of the success of the Chongqing model.   
But the abuse against one of their own also forced those lawyers, 
who had up until then acted with moderation, to become unusually 
politically aggressive and resourceful in order to obtain Li’s exonera-
tion and freedom.120  Chen also sent the Li dossier to powerful people 
in Beijing.121  He and his boss, Fu Yang, framed the Li/Bo issue in 
terms of the competing models it represented: a return to the lawless-
ness and madness of the Cultural Revolution (Bo and the societal 
model of law) versus an advance towards rule of law and democrati-
zation (Li and the jural model of law).122  Unfortunately for Bo, Li 
Zhuang’s law firm was headed by Fu Yang, a fellow princeling who 
had been a close friend of Bo Xilai until their political paths diverged 
as a result of Bo’s adherence to the Cultural Revolution/societal 
model, while Fu had devoted his professional life to quietly promot-
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ing the rule of law.123  Fu’s political credentials are even more im-
pressive than Bo’s: the law firm he now heads was founded by Deng 
Pufang, Deng Xiaoping’s son.  Additionally, Fu’s father, Peng Zhen, 
was one of the key rebuilders of the Chinese legal system after the 
Cultural Revolution, and was given the title of “key founder of Chi-
na’s socialist legal system.”124   
Thus, the fight between Bo and Li became a proxy for a genera-
tions-old struggle between the old guard Maoist princelings of the 
Cultural Revolution and the new China of Deng Xiaoping, Hu and 
Wen, on which the institutional, political, and legal future of China 
hinged.125  Hu and Wen do not come from the princeling caste.126   Bo 
Yibo had led the persecution against Hu and Wen’s patron, Hu Yao-
bang.127  Bo Xilai on the other hand, even after his father’s death ben-
efitted from the patronage from Jiang Zemin and his family, such that 
overthrowing Bo and all he had come to stand for was no easy task, 
even for the powerful Deng-Hu-Wen faction.128  Luckily for the pro-
law and liberalization Deng-Hu-Wen faction, at the same time as he 
was persecuting Li, Bo was involved in a sordid tale of murder 
through his wife, Gu Kailai.129  The foreign elements of the Gu tale of 
intrigue and murder exposed the rot of the Bo administration to inter-
national public opinion. 
VII.  PAYING THE PRICE FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 
Mindful of the dangerous instabilities of Chinese politics and so-
ciety in the past century, and of the irresistible move towards globali-
zation, the Bo-Gus wanted their son, Bo GuaGua, to be a citizen of 
the world.130  Neil Heywood, a public school boy131 from London, be-
 
 123. Until the Bo Xilai/Li Zhuang affair, Fu Yang had stayed out of direct involvement in 
politics and kept a relatively low profile.  However, the arrest of one of his star law-
yers on trumped up charges was too much of an assault on what Fu, his father and his 
law firm stood for. Id. at 73-76. 
 124. Id. at 74-75. 
 125. Id. at 70. 
 126. Id. at 77. 
 127. Id. at 78. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 82, 97. 
 130. Id. at 41, 44. 
 131. Heywood went to Harrow.  Of course, an English “public school” is what the rest of 
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friended GuaGua and acted as his mentor and conduit to the Western 
world.132  It is also rumored that he and Gu Kailai were lovers, and 
that Heywood was a spy.133  In any event, for all her talent as a law-
yer and her cosmopolitanism,134 Gu Kailai was a mentally and emo-
tionally fragile person, and she became convinced that Heywood 
would harm GuaGua after her relationship with the businessman 
soured.135  In November 2011, Gu poisoned Heywood in a hotel 
room.136  The Chongqing Chief of Police, Wang Lijun, later con-
spired with her to destroy the evidence by cremating the body and 
hiding the dossier.  He told her to forget all about it, as Heywood was 
“gone with the wind and passed into eternity.”137  Later, at her trial 
for the murder, Gu declared that she believed Heywood had detained 
GuaGua and was blackmailing him to obtain $20 million he believed 
he was owed as part of a failed business deal.138  Others believe that 
the murder was a crime of passion, perhaps even ordered by Bo him-
self.139  Many who have read her testimony and the court record, in-
cluding GuaGua, consider Gu’s assertions implausible and evidence 
of her impaired state of mind.140   
In January 2012, Wang told Bo he thought Bo should cooperate 
with the Heywood murder investigation and trial.  Bo became furious 
at the suggestion, and fired Wang from his post after calling him dis-
 
 132. Id. at 89. 
 133. Id. at 90-91. 
 134. Gu Kailai was also the daughter of a prominent communist general who was purged 
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University and became a very successful lawyer in Dalian as Bo’s career progressed.  
She went as far as to write a book, Uphold Justice in America about her fight to defend 
the rights of Dalian companies in the United States. HUEI, supra note 62, at 239-240. 
 135. The source of Gu’s mental state of anxiety may have been poisoning.  In 2006, Wang 
Lijun found that some capsules Gu took daily had been laced with mercury, causing 
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loyal and slapping him in the face.141  Fearing for his safety, Wang 
fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, away from Bo’s jurisdiction, 
and the scandal broke out.142  In the safety of the U.S. consulate, 
Wang asked for asylum and unraveled the grotesque tale of murder, 
corruption, money laundering and phone tapping that underlay the Bo 
Xilai, Chongqing success story.143  The Wang defection was of such 
momentous proportion that the Politbureau took an unusual step, sur-
rounding the U.S. consulate with armored vehicles and threatening 
diplomats.144  They dispatched Deputy Mayor Huang Qifan to meet 
with Wang and convince him to turn himself in.145 Wang eventually 
agreed to surrender to the Chinese Ministry of State Security, but in-
sisted on traveling in a crowded commercial plane for fear Bo would 
murder him by causing an accident, as allegedly happened to Lin 
Biao in 1971.146  Officially, the Chongqing authorities declared that 
Wang was suffering from “long term overwork” and was therefore 
going for “vacation-style treatment.”147   
Perhaps the Chinese nomenclature could have forgiven Bo his 
excessive zeal.  Maybe they could have overlooked some aspects of 
his alleged business deals, or ignored his methods.  However, the 
Chinese Communist Party hates to be embarrassed, and the Wang 
Lijun defection was an embarrassment of international proportion.148  
Bo had to go.  However, Bo was not without powerful supporters, so 
the move had to be engineered carefully.  The Chinese Communist 
Party is allergic to any appearance of dissent, which it finds threaten-
ing.  Indeed, the last serious instance of high-level dissent played out 
in public was the June 4 incidents in Tiananmen Square, which very 
nearly brought down the regime.149  Moreover, many Party leaders 
were on record praising the Chongqing model, and Bo had not done 
anything counter to the fundamental ideology of the Party.150  The 
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process to remove him would have to be careful and gradual, and 
maintain the semblance of legal due process.  A side benefit of this 
circumstance was that it advanced the jural model.   
In March 2012, He Guoqiang, Bo’s predecessor in Chongqing, 
paid a visit to the Chongqing delegation present in Beijing for politi-
cal meetings, and said “[t]he climate in Chongqing is very different 
from the climate in Beijing.  So I hope that everyone will take care 
against the cold and stay warm, and be careful to stay healthy.”151  It 
was a clear warning of things to come.  In spite of this, Bo further an-
tagonized his superiors and peers by publicly disclosing China’s ris-
ing Gini coefficient,152 one of the highest in Asia, and essentially de-
claring himself the one true heir of Chairman Mao on the strength of 
his Chongqing model.153  The Party’s reaction was swift.  Wen Jiabao 
repudiated the Chongqing model, calling it “a renegade kingdom 
built on a misguided aim of reviving the Cultural Revolution,” and 
adding “without political structural reform … new problems that 
have cropped up in China’s society will not be fundamentally re-
solved and such historical tragedies as the Cultural Revolution may 
happen again.”154  The next day, Bo was removed as Party Secretary 
of Chongqing.155  Three weeks of wild rumors of a coup staged by Bo 
followed, until Bo was removed from the Central Committee of the 
CCP, and from the Politburo for “serious discipline violations.”156  In 
September, Bo was expelled from the Party for corruption, womaniz-
ing, and abuse of power going all the way back to his Dalian days.157  
He was also accused of being complicit in Heywood’s murder.158 
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On July 26, 2012, Gu was formally charged with Neil Hey-
wood’s murder.159  On August 20, 2012, she was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.160  Two weeks later, Wang was sentenced in Cheng-
du to fifteen years in prison for a long list of crimes including defec-
defection, taking bribes, bending the law for selfish gains, and abuse 
of power.161  The noose was tightening around Bo Xilai. 
Bo Xilai was tried in Jinan in August 2013 in a dramatic five-day 
trial.162  For the first time, transcripts of court proceedings were up-
loaded online on Sina Weibo in real time.163  This was an unprece-
dented move of transparency, reflecting the ideological triumph of 
the jural model and the perceived need of the ruling faction to ob-
serve due process.  Ironically, Bo recanted an earlier confession of 
guilt in bribery, but in closing statements said “I know it is impossi-
ble to escape my fate over this.  There are times too when I feel weak 
 
 159. Tania Branigan, Gu Kailai Will Get Fair Trial, Says China, THE GUARDIAN, July 27, 
2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/27/gu-kailai-fair-trial-china. 
160. Stan Grant & Steven Jiang, Court Suspends Death Sentence Following Conviction of 
Gu Kailai, CNN, Aug. 20, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/19/world/asia/china-
gu-kailai-verdict/.  The sentence was later commuted to life in prison. David Wertime, 
New Year’s Surprise: Jailed Chinese Pol Bo Xilai ‘Physically Okay’, FOREIGN POLICY, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/04/bo-xilai-physically-okay-li-wangzhi-social-
media-update/. 
 161. Tania Branigan, China Jails Bo Xilai’s Former Police Chief Wang Lijun for 15 Years, 
THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/24/china-police-chief-wang-lijun-jailed. 
 162. The charges against Bo Xilai were: (i) Bribery - $3.6 M from two businessmen, to pay 
for a villa in the South of France and shopping sprees.  Bo claimed he was unaware of 
the spending (life in prison, range was 10 years to execution, confiscation of property), 
(ii) Embezzlement - $800,000 for a confidential building project in Dalian while he 
was a top official in Dalian, blamed his wife and the official responsible for the project 
(15 years in prison out of range of 10 years to death, confiscation of 1 million yuan, 
(iii) Abuse of Power – violated procedures by removing police chief Wang Lijun while 
mayor of Chongqing because he had informed him his wife was being investigated for 
the murder of Neil Heywood,  admitted “mistakes” but no crimes and said Wang tried 
to blackmail him and he had higher authority to remove him. Bo Xilai: The Charges 
and Penalties, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2013, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/09/22/bo-xilai-the-charges/; HUEI, supra note 
62, at 249. 
 163. Stanley Lubman, What the Bo Xilai Trial Means for China’s Legal System, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 26, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/09/26/what-the-bo-trial-
means-for-chinas-legal-system/. 
2015  UB Journal of International Law 
 112 
inside.”164  He was sentenced to life in prison, his personal assets 
were seized, and he lost all political rights for life.165 
VIII.  CONCLUSION: IS IT “MORNING IN CHINA?”166 
 The economic and political revolution that came to be known 
as Reagonomics and neoconservatism was launched with Ronald 
Reagan’s campaign slogan, “it’s morning in America.”167  Does the 
defeat of the Bo Xilai factor represent a similar inflection moment in 
China?  Is it safe to conclude that the ghosts of the Cultural Revolu-
tion have once and for all been laid to rest, and that China is moving 
towards a law-based, rational, predictable institutionalized model that 
may in its own time deliver increased political participation by ordi-
nary citizens and a move towards a more modern growth-based liber-
al economy?  Numerous economic studies suggest a high positive 
correlation between political liberalization, economic development 
and growth measured by GDP per capita,168 with civil society playing 
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a crucial role in bringing those two elements together.169  With slow-
ing economic growth and rising popular discontent as manifested by 
the growing number of “mass incidents,” there is no doubt that China 
is standing at a crossroads.  Change too soon, too fast, and risk a so-
cial shock that will be impossible to predict and control.  Change too 
little and too slowly, and face exactly the same danger, as common 
people see the benefits of growth slip out of their reach while the elite 
continue to enjoy a wildly Capitalist lifestyle.   
Many observers have seen in the Bo Xilai trial and its aftermath 
– crackdown on political protests, further repression of netizens and 
activists170 – a sign of a return to the past.  In addition, they point to 
Document No. 9, a memo by senior party leaders denouncing the 
Western Constitutional liberal model, with its separation of powers, 
as unfit for China.171  To believe that that is the end of the story, how-
ever, is to ignore the sinewy ways in which politics move in China.  
For while Document No. 9 is given support, at the same time there is 
increasing official support for the jural model as necessary to the ad-
vancement of China.  The fact that the Hu-Wen faction chose law as 
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a way to bring down its rival faction, led by Bo, is significant.  The 
challenge now is to preserve the economic success brought about by 
the Jiang Zemin faction, which Bo came to represent, along with the 
legal and political reforms the Hu-Wen faction, now represented by 
Xi Jinpin, acknowledge as necessary.  Li Zhuang himself has de-
clared that, for all the shortcomings of the Bo trial, its unprecedented 
openness may well be a harbinger of a new judicial system.172  Addi-
tionally, Zhou Qiang, the new head of the Supreme People’s Court, 
has publicly acknowledged the failings of the legal system and cites 
Xi Jinpin as saying, “in every single legal case in China, we should 
work hard to ensure that the mass of the public feel that they have re-
ceived fair justice.”173  However, observers who expect a wholesale 
migration towards the Western model of “rule of law” and “separa-
tion of powers,” in even the medium term will likely be disappointed.  
For China will, as usual, evolve on its own terms, and at its own pace.  
Moreover, the financial crisis of 2007, as well as the political, eco-
nomic and social crises that are currently gripping Western societies, 
mean that the Western political and economic model now lacks the 
moral authority it once had.  The entire world is looking for a third 
way, and it is fair to say that nobody is in a position to offer an un-
contestable model.  However, looking to the next generation, it is en-
couraging to see that the heir to the Bo political legacy, Bo GuaGua, 
is studying law at Columbia University.  As the story of China’s po-
litical and economic evolution continues to be written, there will be 
many steps forward, and many steps back.  What is important is that 
it keeps moving in the right direction and perhaps teaches the rest of 
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